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ANTITRUST LAW:

EVALUATING FRANCHISE TIE-INS AND TER-

A RETURN TO THE RULE OF REASON - Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
RITORIAL RESTRAINTS IN DUAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.1

The language of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
would seem to outlaw all agreements restraining trade in any way. As
early as 1911, however, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that this interpretation was far too restrictive and, consequently, read a
"rule of reason" into the Sherman Act. In its landmark decision in
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,3 the Court announced that only agreements which are unreasonable in their restraint
of trade would be held violative of section 1.'
The rule of reason initiated in Standard Oil has remained the
dominant standard for evaluating alleged antitrust violations, and is
still applied in most section I litigation. In the past several decades,
1. 15 U.S.C. § I (1976).
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1,26 Stat. 209 (1890).
3. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
4. Id. at 60. In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive examination of
both the text of the Sherman Act and the common law regarding monopolies. It concluded that a
literal reading of the statute would interfere with individuals' freedom to contract. The Court
stated that "[tlhe statute ... evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce
contracts . . .which did not unduly restrain . . .but to protect that commerce from being re-

strained by methods ... which would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint." Id.
The Court specifically held that "in every case where it is claimed that an act or acts are in
violation of the statute the rule of reason, in the light of the principles of law and the public policy
which the act embodies, must be applied." Id. at 66.
5. The most frequently cited statement of the rule of reason came seven years after the
Standard Oil decision. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the
Supreme Court stated:
The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
Id. at 238.
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however, the Supreme Court has exhibited a tendency to declare an
increasing number of trade restraints per se illegal. These restraints
are considered so inherently anticompetitive that their mere existence
constitutes a section 1 violation. When a business entity employs such a
restraint, it is held liable for violating section 1 without any inquiry
into the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the behavior.
In Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. 7 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals confronted the issues of trademark separability and
exclusive territorial allocations' in a franchising context. The court refused to rely upon the "formalistic line drawing"1 0 of a per se approach. Instead, it examined the economic and competitive realities
presented by the franchise arrangement and indicated that a return to
the rule of reason was required in antitrust litigation regarding
franchise agreements.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company (BRICO) operated a
franchise system" which functioned on three levels. BRICO itself, as
owner of the Baskin-Robbins trademarks and patented formulae, was
at the top.1 BRICO selected independent area franchisors which comprised the second tier of the distribution system.' s Further, BRICO as-

signed each area franchisor an exclusive territory and licensed each to
manufacture Baskin-Robbins ice cream products within its respective

6. For practices which the Court has found to be per se violations of the Sherman Act, see
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (vertical price fixing); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of markets among competitors);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price fixing).
7. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-46.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78. The Baskin-Robbins court also dealt with a
claim of wholesale price-fixing. See infra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text. Case law establishes that "the dissemination of price information is not [in itself) a per se violation of the Sherman Act." United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975). Although
something more than mere exchange of information is necessary to render price discussions illegal,
there is some dispute as to whether anticompetitive intent is required, or whether anticompetitive
effect will suffice. See 16A Bus. ORGANIZATIONS (MB) I 6A.02[2] (April, 1981). The BaskinRobbins court found, however, that neither intent nor effect was present in the "idle shop talk"
between BRICO and its area franchisors regarding prices. 664 F.2d at 1357-58. Consequently, the
court never reached the disputed intent/effect question in the price-fixing area of antitrust law.
Thus, its decision on the price-fixing claim will not be treated in this note.
10. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US. 36, 59 (1977).
II. 664 F.2d at 1350.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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territory.' BRICO itself also operated at this second level, functioning
as an area franchisor in six exclusive territories. 15 Because BRICO operated on two levels, the Baskin-Robbins method of operation was a
"dual distribution" system." The third level of the distribution system
consisted of independent franchised store owners." Under their
franchise agreements, these retailers were permitted to sell only Baskin-Robbins ice cream products-which they were required to purchase
from the area franchisor in whose territory their store was located.1 8
A number of BRICO's franchisees brought a class action antitrust
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against BRICO and its area franchisors alleging three separate
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." It was stipulated
that Baskin-Robbins would be entitled to judgment absent proof of a
per se violation.20 At the close of the franchisees' case, the district
court dismissed the charges upon Baskin-Robbins' motion, holding that
the franchisees had failed to establish a prima facie case on any of its
three claims."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review, 2 affirmed the district court's
opinion.2 In disposing of the franchisees' contention that BRICO unlawfully tied the sale of its ice cream products to the sate of the Bas14. Id. BRICO also authorizes the area franchisors to establish and service Baskin-Robbins
franchised retail outlets within their respective territories. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. See infra note 91 for a definition of dual distribution systems.
17. Id. at 1350.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1351.
20. Id. at 1350.
21. Id. at 1351.
22. Under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, an appellate court defers to the trial
court's judgment. Thus, "a finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 39495 (1948). Baskin-Robbins' franchisees contended that the broader standard of de novo review
should be applied on their appeal. Under de nova review the appellate court "[tries] a matter
anew; the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously
rendered." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979). The franchisees based their contention
on the fact that the case rested primarily upon documentary evidence rather than live testimony.
The Baskin-Robbins court rejected that argument, maintaining that the controlling factor in determining the proper standard of review is whether the facts at trial were hotly disputed. The
court held that if the facts at trial were in dispute, then the "clearly erroneous" standard was
appropriate, even if the findings were based entirely on written or documentary evidence. 664 F.2d
at 1352. In its determination, the court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions tried upon the facts ... [flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses."
23. 664 F.2d at 1358.
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kin-Robbins trademark, the court held that the trademark was not a
separate product from the ice cream sold with it and therefore, no illegal tie-in existed.2 4 Similarly, the court determined that the franchisees' claim that the Baskin-Robbins system constituted an illegal horizontal market allocation failed because the franchisees did not prove
concerted activity among competitors-an essential element of the alleged violation."5 Additionally, the court refused to declare dual distribution systems per se illegal." Finally, the court ruled that the franchisees' claim of a price-fixing conspiracy was without merit"' because
the franchisees proved only that BRICO and the area franchisors had
engaged in sporadic exchanges of price information and "the mere exchange of price information, without more, is not per se illegal."' 8

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Tie-In Claim

1. Background
A tie-in exists when a party agrees to sell one product (the "tying"
product) only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a second
("tied") product. 29 The seller exerts its power or leverage in the market
for the tying product to force the purchase of the second, undesired,
item.' 0 Tying arrangements are considered so anticompetitive that the
United States Supreme Court, in 1947, declared them to be per se violations 1 of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Subsequently,
both the Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly treated tieins harshly, asserting that such arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."" These courts reason that
tie-ins both restrict the free choice of the buyer and foreclose competitors from entering the market for the tied product.' 4

24. Id. at 1354.
25. Id. at 1355.
26. Id. at 1357.
27. Id. at 1358.
28. Id. at 1357. See supra note 9.
29. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5-6 (1958).
30. Id. at 6.
31. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The government charged
that International Salt Co. illegally tied the purchase of the salt it manufactured to the leasing of
its salt processing equipment. International Salt claimed on appeal that a summary judgment
granted for the government precluded a trial on the reasonableness of the company's tying practice. The Court held that a trial of reasonableness was unnecessary, because "it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market." 332 U.S. at 396.
32. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
33. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
34. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/8
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By definition, the existence of two products, one of which is tied to
the other, is the essential basis of a tying arrangement. The resolution
of any tie-in claim, then, must initially involve an inquiry as to whether
two distinct products are actually involved. In traditional tie-in cases
involving manufactured goods, there was generally little difficulty in
establishing two distinct products for tying purposes.3
The recent growth of franchising as a method of doing business,
however, has presented a novel tie-in litigation problem. In many cases,
franchisees assert claims that the purchase of equipment, supplies or
other products is tied to the purchase of the franchisor's trademark.
The critical question confronting courts in these cases is whether a
trademark can properly be treated as a separate "product" for tying

purposes.
Courts have been wrestling with the problem of trademark separability for the past twenty years. In 1962, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, while not directly addressing the issue, indicated that a trademark "might" technically produce a tie-in." In 1964, in Susser v. Carvel Corp.,-7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, for the first
time, that a franchisor's trademark can be regarded as a separate item
from the products sold under it.3 The next major decision concerning
the issue of trademark separability came from the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.19 In Chicken Delight,
franchisees claimed that their purchase of cooking equipment, food
items and trademark-bearing packaging was tied to their purchase of
the Chicken Delight trademark license.40 The Chicken Delight court

35. See, e.g.. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (salt is a separate product from salt processing equipment); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (computer punchcards are distinct items from computer software);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (Ist Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 931 (1961) (a silo unloader is separate and distinct from a silo). See also Northern Pacific
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (preferential treatment for lessor tied to land lease).
36. Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962).
37. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381
U.S. 125 (1965).
38. In Carvel, franchisees claimed the purchase of soft ice cream mix and nonpatented toppings was tied to the purchase of the franchise. While holding that Carvel had not violated § Iof
the Sherman Antitrust Act in this instance (because the tie-in was justified by legitimate business
purposes), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[tihere may, of course, be cases
where a trade-mark has acquired such prominence that the coupling of some further item to its
license would constitute a per se violation." Id. at 519.
39. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
40. Upon franchisees' motion for a directed verdict, the trial court ruled that the contractual provisions constituted a tying arrangement as a matter of law. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Therefore, Chicken Delight's appeal forced the court of
appeals to confront the issue of trademark separability directly. The appeals court affirmed the
district court holding that the Chicken Delight trademark did constitute a distinct product, and
that an illegal tie-in existed. 448 F.2d at 52. The court stated that in a franchise situation, the
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distinguished between the historical conception of a trademark as a
strict emblem of the source of the product to which it attaches, and the
more recent use of trademarks as representations of product quality."
The court determined that a trademark of the latter type can be considered a separate item from the products sold under it.' 2 Since the
Chicken Delight trademark was found to be of the "representation of
product quality" type, the court held the required purchases to be an
illegal tying arrangement.'3
2.

The Baskin-Robbins Decision

Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co." provided the opportunity
for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to again face the question of
trademark separability. BRICO's franchisees contended that their
franchise agreements constituted a per se illegal tying arrangement.
The franchisees argued that BRICO tied the purchase of Baskin-Robbins ice cream to the purchase of the highly-desired Baskin-Robbins
trademark. The court's decision on this claim was predicated on the
very definition of a "tying arrangement."' 5 The court stated that "there
can be no unlawful tying arrangement absent proof that there are, in
fact, two separate products."" 6

determination of whether a license to use a franchisor's trademark is a separate product must
involve a consideration of the function of the trademark. Id. at 48.
41. 448 F.2d at 48-49.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 49.
44.. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 35 & 39.
46. 664 F.2d at 1352. Because the court found that the Baskin-Robbins trademark could
not be considered a separate product from the ice cream, the court did not reach a consideration
of whether the other essential elements of a per se illegal tie-in were present. Id.
In contrast to other rules of per se illegality, the per se rule applied to tying arrangements
requires the presence of several factors in addition to the mere existence of the tie-in itself. The
generally accepted definition of the rule today is that a tie-in arrangement is a per se violation of §
I of the Sherman Antitrust Act if the seller has economic power in the tying product, and a not
insubstantial amount of commerce is affected in the tied product market. See Fortner Enters., Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). An additional factor-coercion in imposing the
tying arrangement-is required if the alleged tie-in is the result of dealings between the parties,
rather than imposed by contractual arrangements. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); McAlpine v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
Since tie-ins were first declared per se illegal, the terms "economic power" and "not insubstantial amount of commerce" have been repeatedly broadened in judicial decisions to encompass
a greater number of cases under the per se rule. As a result of this expansion, it has not been
difficult in recent years for a plaintiff to show a per se violation, once a tie-in arrangement is
demonstrated to exist. See McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with
Tie-Ins. 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1107-08 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McCarthy].
For more complete discussions of the development and expansion of the doctrine of per se
illegality, and the cases which served as the vehicles for it, see Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Cope-
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To meet this burden, BRICO's franchisees argued that the BaskinRobbins trademark should be treated as a separate and distinct item
from the ice cream. They relied on Chicken Delight, contending that
case had "established, as a matter of law, that a trademark is invariably a separate item whenever the product it represents is distributed
through a franchise system."41 7 The Baskin-Robbins court rejected this
interpretation of Chicken Delight by relying on the distinction formulated by the Chicken Delight court between the different function of
trademarks in business format as compared with distribution types of
franchise arrangements.4 8 Central to the Baskin-Robbins court's interpretation was the statement in Chicken Delight that "[i]n determining
whether the [trademark] . . . and the remaining . . . items . . . are to
be regarded as distinct items . . . consideration must be given to the
function of trade-marks.' 9 Interpreting this statement, the BaskinRobbins court held that Chicken Delight "stands only for the unremarkable proposition that under certain circumstances, a trademark
may be sufficiently unrelated to the alleged tied product to warrant
treatment as a separate item."' 50
The Baskin-Robbins court's interpretation of Chicken Delight
seems correct. While a superficial reading of the case might support the
Baskin-Robbins franchisees' contention, a careful examination makes it
clear that the Chicken Delight court did not intend that all trademarks
must automatically be treated as separable. The Chicken Delight court
stated that "[t]he historical conception of a trademark as a strict emblem of source of the product to which it attaches has largely been
abandoned." 1 This statement necessarily implies that a trademark
which does function in the traditional manner should be afforded different treatment than the court gave to the representation-of-productquality trademark found to exist in Chicken Delight.
Rejecting the franchisees' contention that a franchisor's trademark
must always be treated as a separate item, the Baskin-Robbins court
determined that the separability of a trademark must be judged on a
case-by-case basis, with a view to the facts of the particular franchise
system in question. The court suggested that several factors must be
taken into consideration in order to determine whether a trademark is
to be properly considered a separate item. The factors delineated were:

land Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); 16A Bus.
ORGANIZATIONS (MB) § 6G.05[21 (April, 1981).
47. 664 F.2d at 1352.
48. Id. at 1352-54.
49. Id. at 1352 (quoting 448 F.2d at 48).
50. 664 F.2d at 1352 (emphasis added).
51. 448 F.2d at 48.
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(1) the type of franchise system involved; (2) the relationship the system establishes between the trademark and the products allegedly tied
to it; and (3) the expectations of the consumer as to what the trademark represents."
The court applied these factors to explain the variance in its holdings on trademark separability in Chicken Delight and Baskin-Robbins." The court began by describing the business-format type of
franchise system, which Chicken Delight operated, as one which is
"usually created merely to conduct business under a common trade
name."" Under this system, the franchisee retail outlet generally produces the end-product sold by the system and the franchisor merely
provides the trademark.55 In the court's view, this type of franchise system usually produces "only a remote connection"" between any products used in operating the retail outlet or producing the end-product
and the trademark itself. "This is true because consumers have no reason to associate [those component goods] with the trademark." '7 The
consumer is attracted to the retail outlet because the trademark represents the goodwill and consistent quality standards of the enterprise;"
he is not attracted because he relates the trademark to any particular
component of the enterprise operation or of the product he purchases.
Because the connection between such components and the trademark is
remote, the court reasoned that the trademark may be considered a
separable item for purposes of a tying claim. 5 '
The court then contrasted Chicken Delight's business format system to the distribution type of franchise system which BRICO operated. The court noted that "significantly different considerations" s0 affect the separability of the trademark in each arrangement. In a
distribution type of franchise system, the franchisor (or, in BRICO's
case, its licensees) is the manufacturer and the system is designed to
merely distribute the franchisor's product. The franchised outlets
"serve merely as conduits through which the trademarked goods of the
franchisor flow to the ultimate consumer."'61 The trademark in such an
organization "serves merely as a representation of the end product

52. 664 F.2d at 1352-54.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1353. This type of system has also been referred to as a "rent-a-name" franchise
operation. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 46, at 1089.
55. 664 F.2d at 1353.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ld.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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marketed by the system."62 Finding that the trademark is thus "'inextricably interrelated in the mind of the consumer" 3 to the quality of
the end-product, the court determined that the trademark cannot be
treated as a separate item from the end-product. Consequently, by definition, no tie-in arrangement can exist."
The court's differentiation between types of franchising systems
appears to be valid. A number of legal scholars have made similar distinctions. 6 Courts have also tended to recognize differences in types of
franchise operations, although often doing so sub silentio. The vast majority of cases presenting the issue of trademark separability in the past
decade have involved franchise systems of the business-format type and
the courts have typically followed the Chicken Delight holding of
trademark separability. 6 The few cases in which a trademark has been
found to be inseparable from allegedly tied products have involved different (from business-format type) franchise systems, and the courts

62. Id. at 1354.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. E.g., Note, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust Law: The Two-Product Rule For
Tying Arrangements, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 953 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Trademark
Franchising].The author noted the difference, as did the Baskin-Robbins court, between an "enterprise" system in which "the franchisor sells a trademark license, not a final trademarked commodity" and a product distribution franchise. Id. at 978. He proposed that in evaluating trademark separability,
the test should be whether the trademark is tendered to the franchisee in conjunction with
or apart from the final product or service. The critical factor is whether the franchisor's
business is based upon the sale of trademark licenses . . . or upon the sale of trademarked
products . . . . The more detached the trademark is from the final product, the greater the
likelihood that it is a separable item in the franchise agreement. Conversely, the more
united the mark is with the final product or packaging, the less likely it is to be separable.
Id. at 978-79.
See Lipner, The Legality of Franchise Lease-Tying, 46 ALB. L. REV. 858, 868 (1982).
"Throughout the 1970's [after the Chicken Delight decision], the distributorship/enterprise distinction was applied with remarkable consistency." Id. at 868. See also infra notes 66 & 67 and
accompanying text; McCarthy, supra note 46, at 1089 (distinguishing among three types of
franchise systems: (1) a manufacturing franchise arrangement; (2) a distributing franchise sys
tem; (3) "rent-a-name" franchises).
66. In this line of cases, as in Chicken Delight, the tied products were component parts used
in the operation of the franchise or in preparation of the end-product. See Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (film processing
tied to trademark); Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1097 (1977), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977) (dry cleaning equipment and incidental
materials tied to trademark); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976) (fixtures, furnishings, equipment, food items and supplementary items tied to trademark); McAlpine
v. Aamco, 461 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (equipment, supplies and repair parts tied to
trademark); Aamco v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (equipment, supplies and repair
parts tied to trademark); Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v. Bratwursthaus Management Corp.,
354 F. Supp. 1237 (E.D. Va. 1973) (furniture, fixtures, food products and supplies tied to
trademark).
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have typically sought to distinguish Chicken Delight on that basis."
The Baskin-Robbins court noted that BRICO's "franchisees may
find the purchase of Baskin-Robbins ice cream undesirable because it
prevents them from selling a less expensive brand of ice cream under
the Baskin-Robbins trademark." 6 8 The court further stated, however,
that "[tjhe antitrust laws . . . are not designed to facilitate such a
fraud upon the consumer."69 In so stating, the court seems to have recognized that treating a franchisor's trademark as separable from the
end-product in a distribution system does not comport with common
sense or with the competitive realities of the system. A manufacturer
establishes such a system for the purpose of distributing its own product. 70 For a court to require the manufacturer to allow its franchisees
to instead purchase and resell the product of a competing manufacturer
would defeat that purpose and make a mockery of the system. The
of Appeals expressed similar sentiments in Redd
Tenth Circuit Court
71
Co.
Oil
Shell
v.
A narrow reading of the Baskin-Robbins decision might indicate
that the court drew strict lines in mandating that a trademark is always a separate item in a business format system and that it is never
properly treated as such in a distribution system. Such an interpretation could be predicated on the court's statement that "the tie-in doctrine can have no application where the trademark serves only to iden17
tify the alleged tied product [i.e., in a distribution system]. , A
broader and more plausible reading indicates, however, that the court
has rejected such "formalistic line drawing,"' '7 and instead enunciated
a rule of reason approach to the question of trademark separability.
The court, for example, did not say that the type of franchise system is
the sole determining factor of the trademark's separability. Rather, it
merely stated that "consideration must be given to the type of franchising system involved." ' 74 An even stronger indication that the court did

67. See, e.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 970 (1981) (trademark sold as part of an "entire package" operation). See also Redd v.
Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976) (franchise
maintained an independent business name, rather than operating under franchisor's trademark).
68. 664 F.2d at 1354, n.15.
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying note 61.
71. 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975). The Redd court stated that "[tihe permissive trademark use did not in any way transform the mark into a separate product to be sold to plaintiff
.... There was certainly no one else in the market selling the . . . trademark, and [the manufacturer] was not selling its trademark separately; it cannot be considered as a 'product.'" Id. at
1057.
72. 664 F.2d at 1354.
73. Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
74. 664 F.2d at 1353 (emphasis added).
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not draw strict lines is its statement that "[w]e express no opinion
whether, in the proper case, a trademark may be so closely linked to a
component of the business format, to preclude a finding that the trade7
mark is a separate product. 1 5
B. Territorial Allocations in a Dual Distribution System - Vertical
or Horizontal?
Horizontal market allocations exist when competitors agree to divide markets in order to eliminate competition among themselves. 7 Because BRICO operated at the same level as the other area
franchisors,7 the franchisees claimed that BRICO's practice of assigning exclusive territories to all of its area franchisors constituted a
horizontal market allocation.7 '
Horizontal market allocations are treated as per se violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,7 ' while vertical restraints are
examined under the rule of reason.' 0 It was therefore necessary that
the Baskin-Robbins court determine whether BRICO's territory allocations were horizontal or vertical in nature. Given the franchisees' stipu-

75. Id.
76. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Timken, an
American manufacturer of antifriction bearings, conspired with foreign competitors to allocate
territories among themselves. Agreements were made between these legally separate entities in
competition with each other (despite the fact that Timken had a financial interest in each of the
foreign companies); the agreements were therefore held violative of § 1.See also GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 43-44 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 342
(N.D. Ill.
1965)): "The [Arnold, Schwinn] court found a § I violation . . .in 'a conspiracy to
divide certain borderline or overlapping counties in the territories served by four Midwestern cycle
distributors.' The court described the violation as a 'division of territory by agreement between the
distributors . . . horizontal in nature', . . ." (citations omitted).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
78. A distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships is basic in all antitrust litigation. A horizontal relationship exists between parties that function at the same level. An example
is the relationship that exists between two companies producing the same or similar products and
selling them in the same geographic market. Similarly, wholesalers of a product have a horizontal
relationship to other wholesalers of the same product, as do retailers of the same product with

each other.

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY

664 (5th ed. 1979).

A vertical relationship is one in which the parties function on different levels of a business
operation. A vertical relationship exists, for example, in a buyer-seller arrangement, or in an association between producers and wholesalers or distributors, between producers and retailers, or
between wholesalers or distributors and retailers. Id. at 1401.
79. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
80. See GTE Sylvania. 433 U.S. at 57-58. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963), the first case involving a vertical territorial restriction, the United States Supreme
Court declared that such arrangements are subject to the rule of reason. Just four years later, in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court held that territorial or
customer restrictions on resale of a product are per se illegal. In GTE Sylvania the Court came
full circle, expressly overruling Schwinn and returning to the rule of reason standard for vertical
territorial restrictions.
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lation that they would prevail only upon proof of a per se violation,81
their claim would necessarily fail if BRICO's allocations were determined to be vertical.
The Baskin-Robbins court refused to declare that BRICO's territorial allocations were horizontal solely on the basis that they were imposed on its competitors. Rather, the court adopted a "functional" approach by analyzing the impetus and nature of the allocations to
the restraints actually functioned vertically or
determine whether
82
horizontally.
In evaluating the restraints, the court focused its attention on the
lack of collusion in assigning territories between BRICO and the area
franchisors. It noted that "[tihe hallmark of horizontal market allocation is collusion among competitors. 83 The court found, based upon
the evidence presented," that BRICO's territory allocations lacked the
requisite "concerted activity among competitors. "85 It pointed out that
the "area franchisors have no voice over BRICO's decisions regarding
grants of

. .

. territories. Indeed, . . . at all times the allocation of

territory was dictated unilaterally by BRICO."" Therefore, the court
determined that BRICO merely imposed vertical restrictions for purposes of a more efficient production and distribution system.' BRICO
did not impose horizontal territorial restrictions in an effort to eliminate competition.
The functional approach adopted by the Baskin-Robbins court accords with the policy and goals of antitrust law which is designed to
promote free competition and eliminate anticompetitive restraints."8
The basis for declaring certain types of restraints per se illegal is that

81. See supra text accompanying note 20.
82. 664 F.2d at 1354-55.
83. Id. at 1354.
84. In trying to establish collusion, the franchisees argued that territories were at times
transferred directly by one area franchisor to another. BRICO, however, offered evidence indicating that it had in those instances ordered the transfer from one area franchisor to another better
able to service the territory in question. Id. at 1355.
It is interesting to note that in similar cases, some courts have held restrictions to be horizontal if the franchisor or manufacturer imposed them in response to distributors' complaints about
the activities of competing distributors. See United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127
(1966); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 936
(1976). Thus, if the Baskin-Robbins court found that BRICO transferred territories from one
area franchisor to another in .response to complaints, it might have held the territorial allocations
to be horizontal. However, there was no evidence to this effect, and no indication in the court's
opinion that the franchisees made this argument.
85. 664 F.2d at 1354.
86. Id. at 1355.
87. Id.
88. For a more complete discussion of the goals of the Sherman Act, see Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copcland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972).
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they are pervasively anticompetitive and in direct opposition to these
goals.89 If territorial restraints, even among competitors, are shown to
be not anticompetitive, there is generally thought to be no reason to
subject them to a rule of per se illegality by merely declaring them to
be horizontal. Courts have repeatedly recognized that market agreements, made between competitive business entities, do not necessarily
result in a reduction of competition.9" Therefore, the Baskin-Robbins
court was correct in looking to the substance of the territorial agreements between BRICO and the area franchisors rather than relying on
the mere existence of competition between them to declare the agreements horizontal and per se illegal.
C. Dual Distribution Systems - Per Se Illegal?
Having determined BRICO's territorial restraints to be vertical,
the Baskin-Robbins court reached the broader issue of the validity of
the Baskin-Robbins franchise system. BRICO's franchisees contended
that "any 'dual distribution' system"1 is, in and of itself, a per se viola-

89.

In Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court stated:

There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without any elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use.
id. at 5.
90. Red Diamond Supply Co. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 119 (1981) involved charges of per se illegal territorial and customer

restrictions. The manufacturer, which supplied its products to distributors and also sold directly to
retailers, was competing with the distributors for sales. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals looked
to the nature and purpose of the restrictions and found them to be vertical, because the manufacturer imposed them for market efficiency rather than to inhibit competition. Id. at 1004. The court
stated that "[w]hen a producer elects to market its goods through distributors, the latter are not,
in an economic sense, competitors of the producer even though the producer also markets some of
the goods itself." Id. at 1005. Similarly, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California applied a functional approach to territorial allocations in Westpoint Pepperell, Inc. v.
Rea, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,341 at 75,739 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Westpoint Pepperell manufactured two lines of carpets, selling one directly to retailers and the other through distributors.
Because the two lines were identical, Westpoint Pepperell was in competition with the distributors
for sales to retailers. The court found that Westpoint Pepperell did not act horizontally in reassigning a distributor's territory, because there was "no evidence ... [that] Westpoint was acting
in its role as a competitor to its distributors." Id. at 75,743.
91. A dual distribution system is a method of business operation in which a manufacturer
competes with its distributors or retailers for sales by utilizing two channels of distribution for its
products. See 16A Bus. ORGANIZATIONS (MB) § 6E.0512][c] (April, 1981). See also Cowley v.
Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). In
Cowley, the producer of windmills sold through distributors and directly to users through coin-

pany-owned outlets. The court referred to this as a "bifurcated distribution system." Id. at 753.
Because Baskin-Robbins ice cream is sold to retail franchisees both by BRICO itself and by
the area franchisors, the Baskin-Robbins method of operation constitutes a dual distribution system. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:1

tion of the antitrust laws.""o Noting a lack of any authority emanating
from the United States Supreme Court, 93 the Baskin-Robbins court
undertook an "inquiry into the appropriate standard under which to
measure the legality of dual distribution systems."" It focused this inquiry upon the impact to competition that the Baskin-Robbins system
caused. The court followed this course in accordance with the Supreme
Court's mandate that "departure from the rule-of-reason standard
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect."' 5
The Baskin-Robbins court was of the opinion that "BRICO's decision to retain [the responsibilities of area franchisor] in certain areas
[did not have] any significant effect on competition."" It pointed out
that whether BRICO retained the territories itself or licensed another
manufacturer to serve them, "there would still be fourteen areas, each
exclusively served by a single manufacturer-franchisor.' 9 BRICO's retention of the territories affected only the identity of the franchisor in a
given area. The court reasoned that if BRICO did not function as an
area franchisor, the system would be identical to that involved in Continental T.V. Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc."o In that case, the Supreme
Court mandated that vertical territorial restraints are subject to the
rule of reason rather than the standard of per se illegality."9
Additionally, the Baskin-Robbins court did not believe that the
franchisees had shown BRICO's distribution system to have a "signifi92. 664 F.2d at 1354.
93. As the Baskin-Robbins court noted, the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
issue of whether dual distribution systems should be declared per se illegal. The Court has, however, decided two antitrust cases which involved such systems. In both cases, the Court treated
territorial restraints as purely vertical in nature. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963), a manufacturer of trucks restricted geographic areas in which its distributors could
sell, and customers to whom they could sell, reserving certain customers for itself. Though this
clearly put the manufacturer in a competitive position relative to its distributors, the Court did not
address the question of whether the restraints were vertical; it assumed them to be vertical, and
proceeded to the issue of whether they should be regarded under the rule of reason or per se
illegality. Similarly, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court assumed territorial
restrictions to be vertical, despite the fact that the bicycle manufacturer was at times in competition with its distributors for sales to retailers. In neither case did the Court address the horizontal
aspects of the distribution system in question.
94. 664 F.2d at 1355-56.
95. Id. at 1356 (quoting 433 U.S. at 58-59).
96. 664 F.2d at 1356.
97. Id.
98. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). "Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted for any given
area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products only from the location or locations
at which he was franchised. [Although a] franchise did not constitute an exclusive territory, ...
Sylvania retained sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an area in light of the
success or failure of existing retailers in developing their market." Id. at 38.
99. Id. at 59.
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cant, adverse impact upon

. . .

intrabrand competition."'' 0 The court

was seemingly incorrect in this part of its opinion. Despite the fact that
BRICO's "franchisees failed to show that any area franchisor is capable of servicing the area of another

. .

. [or] the feasibility of a more

extensive licensing program,"101 the Baskin-Robbins distribution system did limit intrabrand competition. Any use of exclusive territories
necessarily does so.0'" The fact that BRICO's area franchisors had exclusive territories kept them from competing with each other to establish and sell to retail franchisees in the same area. Consequently, the
system had a negative impact on intrabrand competition.10 a
The court next turned its attention to whether the dual distribution system had an adverse impact on interbrand competition.'" The
court's opinion on this question is somewhat unsatisfying, because it
does not indicate what evidence the franchisees presented to show a
negative effect. The court made only a bare statement that the
"[f]ranchisees . . . failed to establish any adverse impact upon inter-

brand competition.' 05
The court went on to note several ways in which "the [BaskinRobbins] distribution system . . . may have actually fostered inter-

brand competition."'" For example, it pointed to the fact that through
the use of this distribution system, BRICO grew from a small company
"serving only local markets" 107 into "the nation's largest chain of icecream specialty stores"' 0 8 with outlets around the world.' °9 BRICO's

100. 664 F.2d at 1356. Intrabrand competition is competition which exists between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer. 433 U.S. at 52, n.19.
101. 664 F.2d at 1356.
102. In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court stated: "Vertical (territorial] restrictions reduce
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the
business of a given group of buyers." 433 U.S. at 54.
103. However, a negative impact on intrabrand competition is not in itself a sufficient basis

for declaring the system per se illegal. The Supreme Court has recognized that although vertical
territorial restrictions adversely impact intrabrand competition, such restrictions have "redeeming
virtues" because they promote interbrand competition. Because of these "redeeming virtues" the
Court determined that such restrictions must be evaluated under the rule of reason. Id. To declare
the Baskin-Robbins dual distribution system per se illegal merely because it restricts intrabrand
competition, would obviate a consideration of the redeeming, competitive qualities of the system.
104. In GTE Sylvania, the United States Supreme Court stated: "Interbrand competition is
the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product [television sets, for example] and is the primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where there is only one manufacturer." Id. at 52, n.19.
105. 664 F.2d at 1356.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.

108. Id. at 1350.
109. BRICO's expansion into new markets can conceivably increase interbrand competition
in two ways: (I) as it enters new markets, its products offer competition for the ice-cream products of other manufacturers already in those markets, and (2) BRICO's success may induce addi-
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output, as well as that of the area franchisors, increased steadily under
the franchise system.110 The court observed that society benefits from
"the availability of a wider variety of products on the competitive market." ' Additionally, the court noted the benefit that society derives
from the operation of franchise systems as opposed to fully integrated
industry giants. 1 '
In addition to noting the competitive aspects of BRICO's dual distribution system itself, the court observed that declaring any particular
distribution system per se illegal may actually prove anticompetitive
under economic analysis.118 The court pointed out that "[c]ompetition
is promoted when manufacturers are given wide latitude in establishing
their method of distribution and in choosing particular distributors. Judicial deference to the manufacturer's business judgment is grounded
in large part on the assumption that the manufacturer's interest in minimum distribution costs will benefit the consumer." " " Therefore, no
particular system should1 15be declared per se illegal "absent a showing of
anti-competitive effect.9
In determining whether dual distribution systems should be declared per se illegal, the court applied the test of "whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output . . .or instead one designed

tional manufacturers to enter the market, thus further increasing interbrand competition.
110. One scholar has noted that such an increase is an indication of increased competition.
Id. at 1356, n.19 (citing Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution. Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav. 6 (1981)).
111. 664 F.2d at 1356, n.20.
112. Many courts and legal scholars have noted the advantages of franchising as a method
of business operation. See generally Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309-11 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); McCarthy, supra note 46, at 1087; Note, Trademark
Franchising, supra note 65. at 958.
113. 664 F.2d at 1356.
114. Id. at 1356-57 (quoting A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Machinery Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1306
(9th Cir. 1981)) (citations omitted). Businessmen seek to maximize their profits by reducing their
costs of production and distribution. They choose an operating system aimed at developing efficiencies in order to accomplish this. Because this can result in lower cost to the consumer, businessmen should be encouraged to develop systems and seek profits in the way they believe is most
efficient. Invalidating a method of business operation removes some of the incentive for them to do
so.

115. Id. at 1356. Limiting a businessman's choice of operational methods by declaring dual
distribution systems per se illegal could prove anticompetitive in an additional way. The Supreme
Court has noted that "[tlo the extent that a per se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise
system to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as important to its successful operation, the rule
creates an incentive for vertical integration." 433 U.S. at 57, n.26.
Vertical integration is "[o]wnership or control of network of production and distribution of
goods from raw materials to sale to ultimate consumer." BLAcK's LAW DiCTIONARY 1401 (5th ed.
1979). Vertical integration, considered as an alternative to dual distribution systems, necessarily
has a stronger negative impact on competition since it eliminates intrabrand competition entirely.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/8

1982]

CASENOTES

'to increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive.' "116 Because of the competitive aspects of the BaskinRobbins dual distribution system, the court found that "application of
the rule of per se illegality would be both inappropriate and anticompetitive." 117 To the extent that the aim of antitrust law is to eliminate
anticompetitive practices, this appears to be the proper decision. Additionally, it is in compliance with the standard set down by the Supreme
Court in GTE Sylvania."' As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,"' "[gliven that the
Court in Sylvania acknowledged that restraints

. . .

may benefit inter-

brand competition, application of a per se rule which does not take
those benefits into account, merely because the parties are also competitors, appears to be inappropriate. 12 0
The nature of per se rules offers perhaps the strongest argument
supporting the Baskin-Robbins decision not to declare dual distribution
12 1
systems per se illegal. Although per se rules do have advantages,
they are harsh and inflexible, and can therefore work injustices at
times. Per se rules should therefore be applied only when no less restrictive means of control would be effective.""' Dual distribution systems, and the restrictions imposed by franchisors under them, can be
kept under control without resorting to the harsh measure of per se
rules. "When anticompetitive effects are shown to result from particular . . . restrictions, they can be adequately policed under the rule of
128
reason."

116. 664 F.2d at 1356 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,19-20 (1980))
(citations omitted).
117. 664 F.2d at 1356.
118. See supra text accompanying note 95.
119. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), affd per curiam, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981). The district court applied the rule of reason where Michelin imposed restrictions on its distributors, despite the fact that the manufacturer competed with the
distributors at the wholesale level.
120. Id. at 754.
121. Much has been said about the merits and disadvantages of the rule of per se illegality.
The frequently recognized advantages are that it provides certainty of exactly which acts are
illegal, consistency, and easy application in litigation, and "avoids the necessity of an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has
been unreasonable .... " Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also
Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972).
122. Despite the recognized advantages of per se rules, legal commentators and judges
agree that, because they are so harsh, they "are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that
is manifestly anticompetitive." 433 U.S. at 50. Professor Turner has pointed out that per se rules
should only be applied if no less restrictive means of control is available, and if the rule would
protect a legitimate antitrust interest. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 59 (1958).
123. 433 U.S. at 59.
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CONCLUSION

Because the Baskin-Robbins court highlighted the need for flexibility in antitrust litigation concerning franchise arrangements, the decision is likely to have a favorable impact on franchisors. The court
held that a franchisor's trademark is not always separable from products sold with it. The court favored a functional approach of examining
the nature and function of a trademark in a particular franchise system
to determine the trademark's separability. Under this standard, a franchisee's bare claim that he was forced to purchase incidental items in
order to obtain his franchise will not establish the existence of an illegal tying arrangement. Unless the franchisee can show that the trademark can properly be considered a separate item, the franchisor can
avoid antitrust liability for a tying arrangement.
Similarly, the court held that market agreements between competitive business entities do not necessarily result in a reduction of competition, and thus are not per se illegal. Consequently, a manufacturer
whose territorial restraints are not found to be anticompetitive will not
be subject to liability merely because he competes with his distributors
for sales.
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